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A strategy that chooses one specific action with certainty.
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A probability distribution over two or more pure strategies.
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Normal-Form Game (Strategic Form) start learning
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A representation of a game using a matrix showing players, their strategies, and their payoffs.
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A representation of a game as a decision tree, showing the order of moves, information sets, and payoffs.
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Players choose their actions at the same time without knowing the others’ choices.
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Players choose in sequence and later players can observe earlier moves.
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A strategy that yields the highest payoff for a player regardless of what the others do.
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A strategy that always yields a worse payoff than another strategy.
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A strategy profile where no player can gain by unilaterally deviating from their strategy.
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Each player strictly prefers the equilibrium strategy to any deviation.
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Subgame Perfect Equilibrium start learning
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A refinement of Nash equilibrium for sequential games: strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium in every subgame.
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A collection of decision nodes that a player cannot distinguish between when making a move.
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All players know each other’s payoffs and strategy sets.
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Some players lack knowledge about others’ payoffs or types (formalized with Bayesian games).
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Players know all prior actions when making a decision.
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Players do not observe all earlier actions.
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A game with incomplete information modeled using “types” and beliefs about those types.
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A probability distribution a player holds about unknown states or the types of other players.
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